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Abstract The purpose of this article is to analyze what
professional emergency personnel learn during collabora-
tion exercises and the benefits of what they have learned.
Observations (n = 19) and semistructured interviews
(n = 32) were carried out in conjunction with major
exercises held in Sweden (2007–2012). The results show
that exercises tend to be based on their own logic, which
differs from actual events. Exercise participants believe
that they mainly learn single-track, parallel, and path-
dependent behavior. The exercises do not facilitate the use
of cross-boundary activities. This means that learning, as
well as benefits from the exercises for actual events, is
limited. The exercises would be more appropriate if those
participating had the opportunity to identify weaknesses,
try alternative ways, and engage in comprehensive orga-
nizational analyses at the conclusion of the exercises.
Based on the results of the study, alternative models for
collaboration exercises are suggested, with elements that
would better develop collaboration and contribute to
learning.
Keywords Ambulance  Collaboration
exercises  Emergency personnel  Police  Rescue
services  Sweden
1 Introduction
Collaboration between professional emergency personnel
is crucial in dealing with accidents, crises, and disasters
(Kapucu 2008; Powley and Nissen 2012; Christensen et al.
2013; Clarke 2013). This is especially true for larger events
when resources are scarce, but also for smaller events when
those who first arrive at the scene are not trained to handle
the specific situation (Scholtens 2008). In most countries,
the police, rescue services, and ambulance are the organi-
zations that deal with a large number of emergency
responses on a daily basis and practice collaboration reg-
ularly (Borodzicz and van Haperen 2002; Grote et al. 2009;
Kapucu et al. 2010; Lateef 2010; Berlin and Carlstro¨m
2011; Van Wart and Kapucu 2011; Andersson et al. 2014).
Exercises prepare them to be able to handle accidents,
crises, and catastrophes in an optimal manner (McConnell
and Drennan 2006; Kapucu et al. 2010; Brattberg 2012;
Berlin and Carlstro¨m 2015).
In Sweden, personnel from police, rescue services, and
ambulance gather regularly to practice. The exercises take
place on the international, national, regional, and local
level. Both management and operational personnel are
involved in the planning, implementation, and follow-up of
the exercises (Ingemarsdotter and Trane´ 2013). The exer-
cises are arranged, for example, in the form of desktop
exercises with simulations of a particular sequence of
events, or as full-scale exercises in a nearby field, where
personnel gather for a day and conduct practical sessions
based on a simulated event.
Full-scale exercises are conducted regularly in order to
strengthen the community’s ability to deal with accidents,
crises, and catastrophes. The aim is to allow professional
emergency personnel to acquire an increased ability to
enlist the help of each other on the operational level, to
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cross organizational boundaries, and be prepared to act in
an integrated manner (Marincioni and Fraboni 2012; Kim
2013). There is a belief that if time and resources are spent
on the exercises, the organizations will become better
prepared to deal with difficult situations than if no exer-
cises are conducted (Sommer et al. 2013). The effects of
the exercises, however, have been described as relatively
difficult to identify (Sinclair et al. 2012). One reason for
this has been that the scenarios have proven to be either too
complex or too simple to contribute to any useful learning
(Boin et al. 2004; Smith 2004; Crichton et al. 2009).
Although the exercises are considered essential for emer-
gency preparedness, research on full-scale exercises
between police, rescue services, and ambulance has been
relatively limited (Perry 2004; Rykkja 2010). This also
applies to what benefits such exercises may have for the
actions at actual events (Quarantelli 1988; Perry and Lin-
dell 2003; GNYHA 2005). The purpose of this article,
therefore, is to analyze what professional emergency per-
sonnel learn from collaboration exercises and the benefits
of what they have learned.
2 Background
Different exercises have different aims. Here, exercise
types with three aims are identified (Table 1). ‘‘Strategic
exercises’’ (model 1) aim to simulate an event to examine
what outcomes different interventions may have. Thus, the
primary aim of such exercises is not the teaching of per-
sonnel at the operational level in the respective organiza-
tion. Rather, the idea of strategic exercises is to analyze the
outcomes of different strategies under different conditions
(Babu et al. 1997). ‘‘Drill exercises’’ (model 2), according
to Berlin and Carlstro¨m (2011), aim to strengthen indi-
viduals’ knowledge in the practice of their profession.
Drills repeat key elements such as the police’s use of
weapons, rescue services’ fire-fighting techniques, and
ambulance personnel’s life-saving efforts. Together with
colleagues, professional methods for the quick handling of
common and recurring tasks are practiced. ‘‘Collaboration
exercises’’ (model 3) aim to bring different organizations
together to integrate actions across organizational bound-
aries. Such exercises challenge the ability to use common
global resources in an optimal way (Berlin and Carlstro¨m
2011). In Sweden, such exercises are called collaboration
exercises because they aim to practice collaboration across
organizational boundaries (Berlin and Carlstro¨m 2008). A
collaboration exercise shows the organizations’ abilities to
prioritize, overlap, and complement each other in a
resource-intensive effort. It is this last exercise model that
is the focus of this study.
Previous studies of collaboration exercises have focused
on the implementation, significance, and function of the
exercises (Mitroff and Anagnos 2001; Fink 2002; Boin
et al. 2005; Coombs 2007; Drennan and McConnell 2007).
There is a widespread assumption that collaboration exer-
cises prepare individuals, rescue teams, and entire agencies
to become better at managing crises (Ingemarsdotter and
Trane´ 2013). However, a serious problem is the difficulty
of creating solutions for managing events that involve
multiorganizational responsibilities (Donahue and Tuohy
2006; Moats et al. 2008). Organizations tend to work in
parallel rather than cooperatively and often have difficulty
understanding each others’ concepts, particularly, organi-
zational models, action logics, agendas, legislations, and
hierarchical levels (Peterson and Perry 1999; Perry 2004;
Berlin and Carlstro¨m 2008; Lee et al. 2009).
Getting emergency personnel to take the initiative to
pull together across organizational boundaries is one of the
key difficulties in a collaboration exercise. This is brought
to a head in situations of resource scarcity or resource
asymmetry. At events where not all the organizations are
represented, the ability to perform the tasks of others is
tested (Berlin and Carlstro¨m 2008). While collaboration
seems to be the goal, in reality, drills have been the focus
of exercises (Berlin and Carlstro¨m 2013). Each organiza-
tion tends to focus on its own priorities and specific tasks
instead of seeing the big picture (Smith and Elliott 2007).
In addition, the participants seem happy to do tasks that
they are used to doing but are passive when unknown tasks
need to be performed (Berlin and Carlstro¨m 2008).
One reason that the focus remains within the individual
organization during exercises, which has been identified, is
that the scenarios are too large and complex (Berlin and
Carlstro¨m 2013). Complex scenarios make it difficult to
evaluate how things fit together (Babu et al. 1997). With
misplaced, overzealous ambition, exercise leaders can
expose organizations to challenges far beyond the ability of
the participants. In their haste, they run around each other
and construct unrealistic chains of events. Such exercises
can have completely opposite effects to the ones intended
and do not lead to learning, increased self-awareness, or
Table 1 Exercise types, learning, and benefit
Exercise type Learning Benefit










Sources Babu et al. (1997), Berlin and Carlstro¨m (2008, 2011)
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development of the participants’ roles (Loveluck 1994;
Borodzicz 1997; Lagadec 1997; Borodzicz and van Ha-
peren 2002; Powley and Nissen 2012).
A disadvantage of exercises, in comparison with actual
events, is that they are fictitious and constructed; thus, they
can never fully address phenomena that arise at the actual
events. Furthermore, the array of accident events that can
befall society are endless; this means that all possible
scenarios can hardly be practiced (Rosenthal 2003;
McLennan et al. 2006; Lalonde 2007; Roux-Dufort 2007;
Lalonde and Roux-Dufort 2013).
Exercises have a tendency to exhibit constructed, arti-
ficial patterns that would not have occurred during an
actual event. Knowing that ‘‘it is not real’’ can lead to
behaviors that deviate from what happens at an actual
event, which prevents participants from gaining experi-
ences that may be used at an actual event (Berlin and
Carlstro¨m 2008). There have been reports of so-called
‘‘infallibility behavior,’’ where participants show off their
best sides in order to make an impression on the other
participants, managers, and external visitors (Boin et al.
2005).
Smith (2004) argues that when there is a learning
exercise culture, the participants are keen to reveal their
own weaknesses. In such circumstances, there is an
assumption that mistakes will happen and that exercises
can reveal these shortcomings. According to Gredler
(1992), effective exercises are comprehensible and provide
space for reflection, which results in new thinking patterns.
Gredler believes that the activities that follow exercises are
just as important as the exercises themselves. Moynihan
(2009) has shown that learning is particularly effective
when professionals learn from each other, through open
forums where participants from different organizations
come together for discussion.
Ineffective exercises repeat the same mistakes exercise
after exercise, the same sources of irritation are recorded,
similar friction is experienced and even though they are
highlighted, the problem is replayed again at the next
exercise. Such exercises do not contribute effectively to the
learning that is appropriate for the activities at actual
events (Boin et al. 2005). Consequently, developing
instructive, appropriate, and effective exercises is a diffi-
cult art for practice management (Alexander 2013), par-
ticularly, if the aim is to enhance preparedness to
collectively handle critical events (Lalonde 2004; Lalonde
and Roux-Dufort 2013).
Learning is one of the benefits of exercises (Smith and
Elliott 2007). Gredler (1992) points out that a beneficial
exercise results in new patterns of thought that are con-
sidered useful in actual events. Thus, learning stands for
development and change. In contrast, police, rescue ser-
vices, and ambulance are stable, reliable, predictable,
rational, and repetitive organizations (Perrow 1984; Fred-
erickson and LaPorte 2002; Boin et al. 2005).
Rutherford (1984) used the concept of path-dependency
to illustrate a collectively accepted opinion and conven-
tional stable behavior. Paths can prevail for a long time.
This is underscored by classical examples of conservative
technologies (Arthur 1988a, b; David 1985, 2001). By
reinforcing processes, alternatives are avoided, and by a
state of collective conservatism, renewal is resisted
(Rutherford 1984). This is the hypothetical core of path
narrowing. A path narrows when options for change are
turned down. This state of inertia is found in publicly
financed organizations that depend on long-established
traditions. Such paths have however proven to be too
narrow (Carlstro¨m 2012). Van Nieuwaal (2006, 2011)
defines narrowing paths as having less room for maneu-
vers. Even though a path can be reinforced, it could still
end up narrowing. However, the narrowing process does
eventually lead to the creation of new paths (Garud and
Karnøe 2001). The new paths are preceded by a deinsti-
tutionalization process of dissolution of ideas and behav-
iors (Hinings and Malhotra 2008).
In contrast to drills, collaboration exercises require
dynamics and the ability to change (Berlin and Carlstro¨m
2008). They require the ability to switch strategies
depending on the situation that exists and being open to
different options (Van Wart and Kapucu 2011; Sommer
and Nja˚ 2012). In a crisis context, change is about, for
example, finding new ways to handle a situation by cus-
tomizing one’s efforts in collaboration with others. The
challenge is to achieve the quickest and best results (Grote
et al. 2009; Nemeth et al. 2011).
Such change is not localized. It affects the majority of
employees in an organization (Blumenthal and Haspeslagh
1994). Haydu (1998) defines institutional change as the
start of a new behavior, which then spreads through a
community. Old models are abandoned when they no
longer serve the organization (Bush 1987).
Institutional change processes are the framework for
institutional learning. Institutional learning occurs on the
collective level as opposed to that in the learning theories
dealing with individual learning (Stein 1997). Institutions
are formed by reciprocity between individuals who, when it
is favorable, change behaviors by creating common
understandings and behaviors (Knudsen 2002).
An institution is based on shared values and with insti-
tutional learning, individuals adapt to shared values.
Institutional learning requires adaptation and an ability to
understand the prevailing conventions that exist in a col-
lective (Appelbaum and Wohl 2000). Already established
institutions are sluggish; they continue to exist and can
withstand influences from the environment for a long time.
In such circumstances, longstanding traditions and single-
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track behaviors dominate (Carlstro¨m 2012). Johansson
et al. (2013) suggest the importance of combining change-
willingness and stability in order to be able to implement
something new and make it sustainable. This stresses the
need to support flexibility and trust, as well as stability,
planning, and repetitive behavior. Alharbi et al. (2014)
suggest that organizations that can balance opposing
characteristics seem to have the best chance to successfully
implement necessary change and sustain it. This is in
accordance with Quinn (1988), who asserts that effective
organizations present contradictory characteristics.
Popular concepts such as collaboration can be decoupled
from actual behavior. In the exercise context, this means
that the ambition of learning does not have any effects on
the behavior at the actual events, and deep-rooted habits
prevent a profound change from taking place (Corbacioglu
and Kapucu 2006). In-depth learning, however, can change
values to the point that the newly learned behaviors are
applied to relevant situations (Stein 1997). According to
Klabbers (1999), the deeper types of learning, also called
second-order learning, consist not only of abstractions and
concepts, but also have elements of intensive collaboration
with others (Deverell 2012; Thompson 2012).
Such learning puts the individual in a social context.
Within the collective of individuals, new thinking and new
methods are developed, which can also be applicable in
different situations. Stein (1997) calls the phenomenon an
institutional learning where routines, rules, and models are
changing and have a great influence on the organization
(Stein 1997; Torres and Preskill 2001).
3 Method
The data for this study were collected over 6 years
(2007–2012). The study’s primary focus is the overall
recurrent features of collaboration exercises. The idea is to
follow the general repeated patterns of behavior over time.
The study’s data come from Sweden, where the police,
rescue services, and ambulance are legally equal. This
means that an officer cannot give orders to personnel other
than within his/her own organization. This approach chal-
lenges organizations when it comes to collaboration.
From a researcher’s perspective, the advantage of
studying exercises as they progress is that they can be
followed directly as it happens. The researcher can follow
and document the participants’ behavior from the arrival of
the first rescue unit until the situation is normalized and the
exercise has been concluded (Scott 1994; Rolfe et al. 1998;
Borodzicz and van Haperen 2002; Lateef 2010; Kim 2013).
Previous studies have largely been based on a retro-
spective approach to capture relevant data (Palm and
Ramsell 2007). To gather data after a real event, however,
is difficult. The events can be viewed as vague hindsight
reconstructions. Those involved often have difficulty
remembering exactly what happened, in what order things
were done, and who did what, how, and when (Sikstro¨m
2002).
Data were collected through semistructured interviews,
accompanying observations, and document studies. During
data collection, we had access to the entire exercise area of
a given exercise. After an exercise, we also had the
opportunity to conduct interviews with the exercise par-
ticipants and exercise leaders. We were able to capture
their understanding of the exercises’ learning effects and
how these influenced them in their daily work. Based on
the observations, questions were asked about the partici-
pants’ experiences and reflections.
The empirical data for this study were collected in
western, eastern, and southern Sweden. The exercises were
conducted in Va¨stra Go¨taland, Stockholm, and Ska˚ne.
Exercise leaders from each organization were responsible
for inviting personnel from their own organizations to
participate. The exercises were designed on the basis of an
accident’s three phases: initial phase (call and arrival),
practical phase (work at the accident site), and a normali-
zation phase (summation, packing up, and completion).
Exercise participants were expected to act as they would
have in a similar actual situation. They made the same
contacts, requested the same resources, and took the same
actions. The exercises were full-scale, with 50–300 par-
ticipants, and lasted from 4 to 48 h. The total dataset
consists of 96 h of observation time. The observation time
was about 5 h on average for each exercise (Table 2).
Data collection through observations is a form of eth-
nographic field research (Hammersley and Atkinson 2005;
Wolcott 2008; Fetterman 2010). In this project, observa-
tion followed the work on collaboration exercises at close
range (Jørgensen 1989; Watson 2011). To be present at
the area where the exercises were performed, we accom-
panied one of the practicing organizations (police, rescue
services, or ambulance) to the exercise site. As observers,
we had an impartial, uninvolved, and passive stance. In
several cases, we were both on site and were able to
capture various parallel events from several angles. The
observations took place where the participants gathered,
such as the command center, at the mock accident scene,
and at the various assembly points. To document the
exercises, we used a notepad, digital camera, and voice
recorder.
The observation method meant that the raw data could
be collected, even though the event itself was at times
relatively fast (Burgess 1991). The analysis was carried out
in three steps. First, we selected the relevant images within
each exercise. In the second step, we coded the images.
Then we sorted and analyzed all the observations as a
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whole (Miles and Huberman 1984/1994; Burgess 1991;
Pope and Mays 2000).
After the exercises, interviews were conducted with the
exercise leaders and personnel. A total of 32 semistructured
interviews were conducted with police officers, rescue
services, and ambulance personnel (Kvale 1996). The total
interview time was 23 h. We had the opportunity to ask
detailed questions about the behaviors we were able to
follow during the observations (Mason 1996; Golden-
Biddle and Locke 1997).
The interview questions related to exercise effects, the
perception of mistakes during the exercise, difficulty with
exercises, learning, and the effects that the exercise had on
regular work. They were used to study and verify the
various progressions and how the collaboration exercises
were understood. The interviews were conducted in per-
son at each interviewee’s workplace. All the interviews
were recorded and transcribed. In order to support certain
key statements and get an understanding of some critical
elements, the interviews and observations were also sup-
plemented with document studies. They were mainly
about descriptions of each exercise and subsequent
evaluations.
4 Empirical Data
In Sweden, full-scale collaboration exercises are conducted
periodically to test society’s catastrophe and crisis pre-
paredness. The exercises are often designed as all-day
activities with a comprehensive scenario, mock victims,
exercise leaders, vehicles, radio traffic, and practicing per-
sonnel. A typical collaboration exercise begins with the
organizations gathering together to review the exercise
conditions, assembly areas, plan of attack, channels of
communication, and safety instructions. Upon completion,
the personnel prepare by gathering equipment, moving
vehicles to assembly areas, synchronizing exercise channels,
and waiting for the alarm. When the call is communicated,
each organization goes to the accident site and starts to act.
The process from start to finish can last 4–6 h. In some cases,
the exercise leaders set a limit for the length of the exercise.
After the exercise, the work materials are collected together
quickly and participants are treated to simple refreshments.
During this period, all participants are gathered, including
the mock victims, for a brief review of the exercise. There-
after, the exercise leaders thank the mock victims and par-
ticipating organizations for a successful and informative
exercise. The exercise is concluded, and the participants
express their gratitude and return to their respective stations.
Several weeks later, the exercise leaders meet to discuss
possible results and what needs to be improved.
4.1 Collaboration
Collaboration is addressed in the following subheadings:
complex scenarios, repetitive behaviors, restricted organi-
zations, sequential behavior, and parallel behavior.
4.1.1 Complex Scenarios
Extensive and complex scenarios dominated the exercises.
In several cases, the exercise leaders wanted to add an
advanced chain of events to a single exercise, challenging a
path-dependent behavior. One example of this approach was
the exercise ‘‘fire at nuclear power plant’’ (Exercise 15,
Table 2). The exercise combined severe weather conditions
with technical breakdowns, a traffic accident in the security
area, a fire in a building, and finally, a reactor accident
involving a radioactive release due to a malfunctioning
backup cooling system. Parts of this chain of events were
meant to confuse and distract from the events that were most
essential. The events were also not related to each other.
Both the exercise leaders and the participants had dif-
ficulty practicing collaboration and using the opportunity to
practice synchronous operation.
Table 2 Collaboration exercises in Sweden observed and analyzed
for the study
No. Year Scenario Observation
time
1. 2007 Fire—elementary school 310 min
2. 2007 Traffic accident between bus and
car
290 min
3. 2007 Fire—car ferry 250 min
4. 2007 Fire—high school 270 min
5. 2008 Fire—prison 330 min
6. 2008 Fire—car tunnel 240 min
7. 2008 Airplane crash 330 min
8. 2008 Fire—car ferry 280 min
9. 2009 Fire—large passenger ferry 290 min
10. 2009 Fire—elementary school 250 min
11. 2009 Threat of suicide bomb 300 min
12. 2009 Fire—defense headquarters 310 min
13. 2010 Train collision 330 min
14. 2010 Car accident pileup 260 min
15. 2011 Fire—nuclear power plant 360 min
16. 2011 Accident between bus and car 320 min
17. 2011 Fire—transport ferry 320 min
18. 2011 Fire—military naval base 360 min
19. 2012 Train collision at O¨resund Bridge 360 min
Total: 5,760 min (96 h)
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Exercises often go off the tracks and become too big.
(Paramedic)
In order to create structure, some exercise leaders went
in and coached the key players in the exercise so that they
would not lose track of the event’s development. Exercise
leaders became a kind of ‘‘exercise prompter’’ and steered
the course of the event so that it was consistent with their
planning. Any shortcomings in the exercise were prompted
with various ad hoc solutions.
… in such a major exercise in which there are so
many participants, the exercise leaders go and give
small hints and try to control it, so it doesn’t become
completely crazy.
(Chief, Fireman)
The exercise’s complexity, the number of organizations,
and the arrangements also made it harder to explain the
idea and purpose of the exercise in an easy and compre-
hensible manner. Exercise leaders had no clear division of
responsibilities among them, which affected the logistics,
as well as who should do what in connection with the
exercise. In the ‘‘fire in the prison’’ exercise (Exercise 5,
Table 2), confusion arose because of the ambiguities
between the exercise leaders and the prison staff. Police,
rescue services, and ambulance had difficulty getting
access to the prison area because the prison security staff
followed normal procedures for entry and exit. The high
safety measures at the prison made it difficult for those
practicing to move smoothly inside the prison area. The
participating personnel demobilized guns, batons, and
pepper spray, and found it difficult to act as they would
at an actual event inside the prison area. The ambulance
personnel were not admitted inside and instead stood
waiting outside the prison’s security gates.
Complex and difficult to manage scenarios and lengthy
exercise sessions contributed to the exercise becoming
passive. Participants tended to wait for each other in the
hope that someone else would take the initiative. They
chose not to mingle with the participants from the other
organizations. If the aim was to achieve collaboration by
increasing the complexity, it had the opposite effect. Par-
ticipants avoided collaboration and isolated themselves by
being with their own colleagues.
The complexity also meant that there could be unnec-
essary waiting times, for example, to wait for the call, to
drive to the accident site, to take action at the accident site,
to pack up, to get a snack, and to go home. The exercise got
stuck and the development of the event did not go
smoothly. The mock victims had to wait a long time before
they were taken care of, in some cases getting exposed to
the cold as a result. A large part of the personnel never got
the opportunity to practice synchronous collaboration. In
the ‘‘fire in the car tunnel’’ exercise (Exercise 6, Table 2),
there was such a long waiting time that a dozen people
never got to participate in the exercise. Both the police and
the ambulance personnel stood a distance away from the
accident site and listened to the radio traffic. A growing
dissatisfaction arose at the assembly area; small groups of
personnel stood idly in the biting wind at a parking lot and
talked about how useless it felt to not participate actively in
the exercise. In the ‘‘airplane crash’’ exercise (Exercise 7,
Table 2), a rumor spread about whether there was a bomber
on board a crashed plane (Fig. 1).
The plane was on fire and there were a large number of
casualties and serious injuries on board. The rumor of a
terrorist attack meant that the police cordoned off the area
for 40 min to search for the perpetrator. Despite the
severity of the injuries, the mock victims were lined up on
the runway to be searched and interrogated. In the end, the
police intervention was stopped because the mock victims
were not dressed for the cold weather and began to show
signs of exposure. The complexity of the event and the 10
organizations involved meant that the cross-boundary col-
laboration moments were difficult to attain. The delay
affected the continuation of the exercise; efforts ended up
being brief and were conducted dutifully without much
enthusiasm.
4.1.2 Repetitive Behaviors and Restricted Organizations
One feature of the exercises was that those practicing had
to repeat simple steps that they were already capable of
doing and had practiced in their own organization. For
example, the rescue services personnel carried out the
injured throughout the exercise. In the ‘‘fire in the high
school’’ and ‘‘fire in the elementary school’’ exercises
(Exercises 4 and 10, Table 2), firemen wearing smoke
helmets evacuated smoke-injured young people for most of
the exercise, a task that they were well acquainted with
from previous experience (Fig. 2). The same applied to
Fig. 1 Evacuation from aircraft (Exercise 7). Photograph by A. Hall,
9 September 2008
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ambulance personnel. In 15 of the exercises, the ambulance
personnel devoted themselves mainly to tasks that were
included in their regular practice, that is, to assess,
immobilize, and stabilize patients and then load and
transport them to the hospital. In several of the exercises,
some 20 individuals from the ambulance personnel worked
only on these tasks. Other personnel, especially police
officers, were engaged in only a few of these tasks. The
repetitive elements were prioritized over collaboration
elements. Police officers often found themselves at the
barrier tape and watched the event from a distance,
recorded data, took witness statements, and maintained
order. These elements were repeated over and over again
until the conclusion of the exercise. It meant that the
exercise time was filled with simple tasks, and the number
of synchronous collaboration elements was minimized.
Communication between those practicing was flawed. The
tasks were performed side-by-side without mutual inter-
action or coordination.
In the ‘‘fire on a car ferry’’ exercise (Exercise 3,
Table 2), resources were needed to transport the injured.
Because of an inadequate radio communication, most of
the police units and some of the ambulance services had
difficulties locating the ferry.
The communication that occurred was mostly within
each organization. Several police units had placed them-
selves at checkpoints in remote areas on the beach, far from
the car ferry. Some police officers boarded the ferry using a
police boat but did not pay any attention to the injured.
They passively looked on as understaffed ambulance per-
sonnel worked to attend to, carry, and transport the injured.
Subsequent interviews revealed that the police personnel
felt unsure of working with the injured individuals. In an
interview, a police officer explained the reason for the
hesitation to get involved:
We are not used to working with injured individuals.
It feels like carrying or handling the injured
improperly could worsen the situation.
(Police)
In the ‘‘fire in the elementary school’’ exercise (Exercise
10, Table 2), police were instructed to register injured
students. A large number of police officers were allocated
throughout the exercise to record the names and addresses
of the mock victims on preprinted forms. When the
exercise was over, the forms were collected and discarded.
A feeling of discontent spread among the police personnel
who felt that the exercise was rather pointless. Their
collaboration with the other organizations had been limited
during the exercise. The task they kept busy with—filling
out personal information on claim forms—had nothing to
do with collaboration.
4.1.3 Sequential and Parallel Behavior
The collaboration that occurred in all observed exercises
was mainly limited to sequential and parallel collaboration,
which essentially meant that each organization performed
its tasks, one at a time, or worked in parallel side-by-side
with the other organizations. Synchronous or overlapping
seamless collaboration between organizations could occur
for short periods. It seemed spontaneous when working on
the extrication of victims from wrecked cars, evacuation of
victims from a bus, or evacuation of the wounded from a
burning building. This meant that the advanced collabo-
ration elements were practiced relatively sparsely during
the exercises.
We try to work as it is stated in our plans. The rescue
leader does his thing, the police do theirs, and
ambulance personnel do their tasks. Then we try to
resolve issues individually.
(Ambulance Nurse)
It proved difficult to break down organizational barriers
and collaborate with people the exercise participants did
not know and were not used to working with. In the ‘‘fire at
the defense headquarters’’ exercise (Exercise 12, Table 2),
one police officer had difficulty getting help to carry a
person who had been injured due to the smoke from the
building. Personnel from the ambulance and rescue
services did not see it as their duty to help the police
officer even though they were just a few meters away. The
police officer, instead, got some unexpected help from a
civilian observer who came and helped to carry the smoke-
injured victim to the medical care area.
In the ‘‘fire on a car ferry’’ exercise (Exercise 3,
Table 2), the engine room on a car ferry had caught fire
while out in the middle of the lake. The rescue services,
Fig. 2 Firefighters carry injured (Exercise 4). Photograph by J.
Berlin, 3 October 2007
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police, and ambulance were supposed to rescue the injured,
exhausted, and shocked victims using boats and trans-
porting them to the medical assembly areas located on
land. The police boat kept its distance during the rescue
work and did not rescue the smoke-injured people from the
car ferry. Rescue service and ambulance boats did not
coordinate the work among themselves. They did not know
what the others were doing or which part of the car ferry
was supposed to be taken care of. Organizations worked
sequentially and in parallel but without common
coordination.
In the ‘‘fire at the military naval base’’ exercise (Exer-
cise 18, Table 2), an arson fire occurred in connection with
a school visit at a military naval base. Efforts to rescue the
injured were delayed significantly because the ambulance
personnel did not go down into the underground rock
caverns until the police had surrounded, blocked off, and
secured the area. The area in the rock caverns was quite
large, which made it impossible for the police to secure the
area within a short time. The fact that the organizations
misunderstood each other meant that the exercise leaders
finally had to order the ambulance personnel to begin the
crucial life-saving medical work down in the rock cavern,
even though the area was not cordoned off and secured.
The police conducted the subsequent evaluation internally.
The other participants did not get any insight into how the
other organizations had arrived at different decisions dur-
ing the exercise.
In the ‘‘fire on car ferry’’ exercise (Exercise 8, Table 2),
some 20 injured persons were evacuated (Fig. 3). Already
at the beginning of the exercise, the organizations split up
and began repetitively to perform their own tasks, without
evaluating the overall needs. This meant that the exercise
was out of step and the quality of the efforts varied because
some periods were understaffed. The reason was that those
practicing did not keep track of the overall picture at
critical moments.
In the studied exercises, the exercise leaders generally
considered collaboration as something that was ‘‘given’’
and ‘‘well-proven,’’ while in reality it was not ‘‘given’’ how
organizations should act together during the exercise. To
handle the situation, the participants, for the most part,
worked sequentially and in parallel. The synchronous,
cross-boundary operations the exercises were intended to
rehearse, encourage, and reinforce were rarely in evidence.
4.2 Lessons Learned
The section Lessons Learned refers to the data collected and
asks the question ‘‘What did you learn at the exercise?’’
4.2.1 What Did You Learn at the Exercise?
During subsequent interviews, the participants found it
difficult to articulate clearly what they learned during the
exercise. Some focused on a variety of practical features,
others highlighted personal reflections, while a large group
did not perceive that they had learned anything at all. One
interviewee described it this way:
What did you learn about collaboration?
Well, actually nothing, you can say. I sound very
negative, but I did nothing. I stood there and sent
people to an assembly area, I mean, that’s nothing. It
taught me nothing.
(Ambulance Nurse)
Some chose to view the fact that the exercises did not focus on
collaboration as an experience. They perceived that they could
still learn something from the exercise that could be applied and
used in a real event. Therefore, many of the participants thought
it was important to make mistakes, try things on their own during
the exercise, and test alternative strategies.
… it’s really through mistakes that one learns (…)…
if you end up in an exercise scenario where things do
not work well, you can use that at an actual event,
where you can change the things that did not work.
(Ambulance Nurse)
… regardless of how it goes, you always learn
something in the exercises. (…) It is also an experi-
ence of collaboration exercises that it does not really
matter how it goes, you always learn something.
That’s worth something in itself.
(Chief, Fireman)
I think it is important that the exercises are designed
in such a way that you can really try different things
that could fail and then compare different strategies.
(Ambulance Nurse)
Fig. 3 Work at the collection point for the injured (Exercise 8).
Photograph by J. Berlin, 16 October 2008
Int J Disaster Risk Sci 199
123
One difficulty was that very little time was allocated
following the exercises to discuss experiences and reflec-
tions in connection with the exercises. When the exercises
were concluded, the material had to be packed up and a
meal had to be served. In most cases, there was not much
time left for collective reflections.
There wasn’t much time for collaboration in this
exercise. A longer discussion might have been pref-
erable. Then we would also have learned more about
how the others work and how to collaborate better.
(Fireman)
Long, time-consuming exercises made it difficult to
have enough time for monitoring and evaluating.
I think that what happens afterward is almost more
important than the exercise itself, to tie things up, and
it was short, I think, and stressful. It’s always the
same when you have exercises, there isn’t enough
time. But it must be planned so that you have plenty
of time to assess and learn from it.
(Police)
There was a need to plan the exercises so that those
practicing did not run out of time at the end. Respondents
felt that more emphasis needed to be placed on a concluding
evaluation with discussion, feedback, and reflection.
4.3 Benefit
The section Benefit is based on questions relating to the
perceived value or usefulness of the collaboration exercises
in actual situations.
4.3.1 Value of Collaboration Exercises in Actual
Situations
There were different views on the extent to which those
practicing had gained some benefit from the collaboration
exercise, which could be used in actual situations. The
responses can be grouped into two categories. There was a
small group who felt that they did not gain any benefits from
the exercise and a larger group who believed that they had
gained limited benefits from the exercise, which could be
useful in actual accident work. Those who found it difficult to
relate the exercise to their daily work felt that the situations
that were practiced were too broadly constructed and cum-
bersome to be recognized as being related to the regular work.
Do you use what you learn in the exercises in actual
situations?
No, I cannot think of anything that I’ve used actually.
(Police)
It’s so seldom, or almost never, that one or that I’ve
been through this kind of complex event with so
many injured. Then, the incident seemed imaginary.
It makes it hard to bring this to your daily work.
(Fireman)
Unfortunately, it’s a little bad with the lessons
learned, I would say. It seems that you forget what
you’ve learned when it happens for real. (…) In
principle, we almost never do this with markings and
logbooks in reality. We never have this claims
experience. I have worked since 1994, and have never
been part of that.
(Exercise Leader, Police)
I felt like I have learned nothing new about this here.
So there’s not much I can take with me.
(Ambulance Nurse)
The reason that the exercises did not have a stronger
impact on the actual accident work was due to the extent
of the exercises, lack of realism, and the participants’
difficulty to empathize with and relate to the exercise
scenario. A large proportion of respondents felt that they
could relate some parts of the exercises to real situations.
In particular, when new strategies were tried, they turned
out to work in actual situations. One interviewee expres-
sed it like this:
Finally… at an exercise, then I did this and this and it
actually worked well. I am testing it and also using it
now in a critical situation.
(Ambulance Paramedic)
Through the exercises, those practicing could test their
stress tolerance. Even if the scenarios were so confusing
that things were difficult to evaluate, the participants could
test their ability to stay calm and think clearly. Many of
them saw this as beneficial for actual events.
At the same time, I want to state that these exercises,
they help in that in real-life situations, they keep you
a little bit, a little calmer, and you start thinking in a
different way already on the way.
(Ambulance Paramedic)
Although it was difficult to specify exactly what from an
exercise could be beneficial in an actual event, several
respondents felt that the exercise contributed to an
unconscious experience, which was activated during actual
events. The experience of the exercise remained with them
and affected the practical work in the field. This was a good
reason for having these exercises regularly and for the
participants who met at actual events to participate in the
collaboration exercises.
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Yes, absolutely. Everything we practice, you put in a
backpack. You put it somewhere in the back of your
head. If you end up in a similar situation again, you
remember what you did in the exercise. All exercises
give you experience.
(Fireman)
A limitation in terms of the benefits was that it was
difficult to transfer the experiences of those practicing to
other colleagues in the same organization who did not
participate in the exercise. The respondents expressed that
there was a transmission problem within the organization
that was difficult to come to terms with.
It’s very difficult to take the experiences from one
exercise and try to share them with those who were
not there.
(Chief, Fireman)
Often, the exercise evaluations came long after the
exercises had been conducted and the colleagues did not
read them. A few people talked about the lessons learned
from these exercises. When those practicing had returned
home, it was as if the exercises had never occurred. This
meant that the exercises could be beneficial to those
practicing, but not for those colleagues who did not
participate.
Another manifestation of the difficulty with the exer-
cises was to get the experienced officers of each organi-
zation to sign up for the collaboration exercises. In many
cases, they did not want to participate. They switched their
shift or took sick leave to avoid the exercise.
The regular officers do not want to go. They are
afraid to appear weak. (…) In the past, I checked
them off on a list. Then they switched their shift at
the last minute with someone else.
(Exercise Leader, Police)
This tended to result in a certain contagious effect when
even younger employees were reluctant to participate in the
exercises.
5 Analysis
The exercises studied were intended to strengthen the
ability to prioritize, overlap, and complement each other at
events that required efforts from multiple organizations at
the same time. The focus of the exercises was thus col-
laboration, and the learning and the benefits that were
expected by those practicing were primarily the ability to
work across boundaries and use common resources as
optimally as possible.
However, the results from the exercises showed that the
collaboration elements were relatively limited. Participa-
tion mainly consisted of sequential and parallel behavior,
that is, each organization performed its tasks, one at a time,
or side-by-side. Synchronous or seamless collaboration
occurred only briefly and was hindered because the exer-
cises were unstructured, had messy scenarios, and com-
plicated chains of events. In addition, collaboration was
limited by involuntary inactivity, long waiting periods, and
repetition of already known elements.
Learning was dependent on the possibilities to collab-
orate during the exercises. It benefited from opportunities
to test different strategies and making room for discussion.
It was hampered by the police, ambulance, and rescue
services prioritizing the focus within their own organiza-
tion and by the lack of exercises that allowed for common
reflection (Alexander 2013).
The benefits from the exercises were that innovative
approaches were tested, stress tolerance was tested, and
routines were carried out. However, the benefits were
limited by unrealistic scenarios, constructed layout,
Table 3 The most important results divided into collaboration, learning, and benefit
A. Collaboration B. Learning C. Benefit
Appeared as Appeared as Appeared when
Sequential and parallel Opportunities to make mistakes Innovative approaches were tested
Synchronous for short periods Ability to test different strategies Realistic scenarios were used
Comparisons Application of systematic approaches and guidelines
Discussions
Hindered by Hindered by Hindered by
Internal organizational focus Lack of structure Unrealistic scenarios
Advanced scenarios No common reflection Constructed scenarios
Passivity Few high-level organizational discussions Complex organization
Long waits Exercise leaders acting like teleprompters Difficult to transfer experience to colleagues
Focus on simple elements (drill)
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cumbersome organization, and difficulties in transferring
one’s experiences to colleagues who did not participate in
the exercises (Table 3).
When it comes to learning, Stein (1997) asserts that
there is a difference between the immediate learning or
imitation of different behaviors and a deeper learning that
fundamentally changes the behavior of the person prac-
ticing. This argument highlights the difficulty that arises
when exercise leaders are too prescriptive during an exer-
cise. The effect can be that those practicing do not see the
consequence of a particular strategy, which prevents
learning. Such an approach can also contribute to a pro-
cedural approach in which the exercise leaders and the
participants strive to get to a ‘‘flawless’’ exemplary exer-
cise (Boin et al. 2005). The respondents questioned the
purpose of the exercises and thought it was meaningless
and time-consuming to act in a sequential and parallel way
during a collaboration exercise. They requested joint dis-
cussions at the conclusion of the exercises. They also
wanted more opportunities to gain insights into the col-
laborating organizations, to openly discuss the strengths
and weaknesses, and to refine and develop the approaches
in dialogue with each other (Senge 1990). Some respon-
dents even believed that they did not gain any direct ben-
efits from the collaboration exercise they participated in.
Nonetheless, the respondents emphasized the value of
being able to make mistakes and then also having the
opportunity to repeat an element to correct any errors. This
meant that different approaches could be tested and com-
pared, something that could result in new patterns of
thought, that is, development and change (Gredler 1992).
The exercises, however, mainly consisted of repetitive
actions. The emergency personnel avoided mingling with
the participants from the other organizations. When the
scenario became complex, the personnel avoided collabo-
ration and isolated themselves by being with their own
colleagues, and repeated simple steps that they were
already familiar with. The actions were path-dependent and
conventional (Rutherford 1984).
The respondents indicated, however, an emerging path
narrowing. The options for change, as expressed by the
participants, were rejected, indicating limited room for
maneuvers (Van Nieuwaal 2006). Such narrowing pro-
cesses often end up being frustrating and eventually change
behaviors (Van den Ven and Poole 1995; Garud and Kar-
nøe 2001). Consequently, critique from the participants can
contribute to change, introducing new and more organic
ways to perform collaboration exercises (Carlstro¨m 2012).
The concept of deinstitutionalization preceding something
new, presented by Hinings and Malhotra (2008), can be
useful in order to identify the change process of conser-
vative organizations characterized by long traditions and
stability.
During the interviews, none of the respondents focused
on the exercise that was practiced. This suggests that the
scenario is secondary to collaboration skills. Even if the
techniques and approaches were different at different
events, it seemed that the ability to collaborate was central
to those participating in the exercise. It was about prac-
ticing collaboration techniques, structures, and communi-
cation that could easily be applied to all kinds of events.
This suggests that collaboration exercises, regardless of the
specific scenario, can be designed so that they are benefi-
cial for all types of crises, provided that they focus on
overlap and the ability to use common resources optimally.
One purpose of complex scenarios is to achieve col-
laboration by forcing participants to seek help from each
other. However, the complexity of the exercises had the
opposite effect and helped to create uncertainty. The staff
isolated themselves and solved tasks together with the
colleagues from their own organization. Since institutional
learning is cultural and based on common experiences,
norms, and beliefs, isolation can prevent learning (Fiol and
Lyles 1985). The complexity tended to reduce the cross-
boundary collaboration between the participants.
The interviews show that the exercises need to be
structured and that efforts should mainly be based on
known routines, that is, applying the repetitive knowledge
that every profession exercises regularly. Bergstro¨m et al.
(2010) have shown that a lack of structure and the absence
of routines, in favor of an exaggerated belief in prestigeless
collaboration, lead to uncertainty. It was confirmed by
interviews that participants in certain exercises became
passive because of overambitious, unstructured, and messy
exercises (Powley and Nissen 2012). Although the exer-
cises need to have elements of improvisation and unex-
pected situations (Mendonc¸a and Fiedrich 2006; Grote
et al. 2009), they also need to allow for well-established
structures. One way to achieve this is to make sure that the
exercise has a clear purpose and a structure, as well as
clearly defined roles for participants (Petrenj et al. 2011).
This approach calls for the integration of change-willing-
ness and stability. If the participating organizations can
balance contrasting characteristics such as flexibility and
firmness, then learning can be more than an individualistic
and repetitive behavior (drill). New integrative strategies
can be developed and implemented (collaboration exer-
cises) (Johansson et al. 2013; Alharbi et al. 2014).
Thus, an exercise can ideally be designed as a collabo-
ration exercise when it is applicable to different situations
and provides the individual with relevant challenges. It
should also allow some space for participants to synchro-
nize their work with those from the other organizations.
The essence of a collaboration exercise, as opposed to
strategic exercises and drills, is to help strengthen an
organization’s cross-boundary behavior (Moynihan 2009).
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Allowing those who are practicing to test different
approaches to deal with an event, and then to evaluate the
effects can, in the next stage, allow for a new approach to
be tested, which supports successive method development.
With such a model, institutional learning can be developed
as an operational approach. It may result in new ways of
thinking. Under such circumstances, the exercise would be
a way to identify weaknesses and try alternative ways to
address actual events.
The data in t his study comes only from Sweden. To
confirm the results of the study and its application in other
countries, similar studies need to be done. The study is also
limited in that only collaboration exercises were studied.
Experiences from other forms of exercises with other aims
can only partly be applied to this study. A further limitation
is that learning as a benefit of collaboration exercises is
based on the respondents’ expressed perceptions. Further
research that measures learning and benefits of collabora-
tion exercises are needed to confirm the study’s results.
6 Conclusion
By focusing on the collaboration elements during exer-
cises, that is: (1) encourage synchronous collaboration, (2)
test alternative strategies, (3) be able to make mistakes, (4)
encourage comparisons, and (5) have joint evaluations,
vulnerability can be reduced and preparedness to handle
events that require advanced collaboration can be
strengthened. This applies regardless of the scenario’s
characteristics, as the ability to collaborate is also appli-
cable to other situations.
The study’s findings can inspire exercise leaders to
create cross-boundary exercises that have more focus on
the common task. However, there is need to examine the
effects of such exercises in future studies. This could be
accomplished by creating shorter exercises with more
synchronous collaboration elements than were observed in
these exercises.
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